It is, at least it should be, impossible for India and Sri Lanka to quarrel. We are the nearest neighbors. We are inheritors of a common culture,” Mahatma Gandhi once said.
Theoretically, Gandhi’s statement should hold good, as the cultural, linguistic, religious and economic history of India and Sri Lanka (which was known as “Ceylon” from the Colonial period up to 1972), are closely intertwined. But since the Colonial era, the two countries have drifted apart, with the relationship increasingly marked by tension and mutual suspicion rather than friendship and cooperation.
Historical ties
Buddhism, which is the religion of more than 70 percent of Sri Lankans, was brought to Sri Lanka by Emperor Ashoka’s son, Prince Mahinda. Sinhalese, which is the language of the majority of Sri Lankans, is highly Sanskritised. Even while being devout Buddhists, the Sinhalese worship all the Hindu Gods, with the notable exception of Rama, perhaps because of the Ramayana, in which Rama defeated the Sri Lankan King Ravana, and in which, Sri Lankans are described as demons.
Down the ages, Sri Lankan Kings had traced their mythical ancestries to the Surya and Chandra Vamsas of India and had preferred to marry Indian princesses to acquire legitimacy as Kshatriyas. Sri Lankan Kings recruited soldiers from India, particularly Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, and had formed alliances with Madurai and Thanjavur kingdoms to defeat their enemies in the island. Tamils had ruled parts of Sri Lanka for long periods. However, despite the multifarious ties with India, especially South India, there had been deep tensions too. The Cholas were seen as invaders, destroyers of Buddhism, and the irrigation system. The Sinhalese-Buddhist historical chronicle Mahawamsa, which signifies Sinhalese-Buddhist resurgence, portrays Tamils and Hindu beliefs in bad light. The present Tamil-Sinhalese ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka draws sustenance from the Mahawamsa. Nevertheless, there was no “ethnic conflict” as such in Sri Lanka, till the 20th century. And that was entirely due to the effects of British rule – the economic, administrative and political system the colonial ruler introduced. Prior to the establishment of British rule, the economic and cultural synergies between Sri Lanka and India, Sri Lankans and Indians, and Sinhalese Buddhists and Tamil Hindus, were stronger than the discrepancies.
Relations were symbiotic rather than antagonistic. Trade was in the hands of the Tamils and Muslims (who lived in the coastal areas), and the biggest chunk of Sri Lanka’s international trade was with India. The language of trade was Tamil, as the mother tongue of the Muslims was also Tamil, though they were part Arab in origin. Many castes and communities came down from India to work in specialised trades. The Karavas, Salagamas, Chetties and Warnakulasuriyas are among them. None of these aspects of Sri Lankan society posed any problem. Sri Lanka was absorbent and accommodative.
First signs of conflict
The first signs of India-Sri Lanka conflict appeared in the last part of the 18th century and the early years of the 19th, when Madras officials ruled the island. The Madras system of taxation and general administration was unsuited to Sri Lankan traditions. The locals revolted against the Madras officials in 1797. When the Madras rule ended in 1802, the British government made Ceylon a Crown Colony, putting it directly under it.
When the British saw potential in growing coffee, tea and rubber in mid-19th century, they looked for local wage labour. Not finding willing workers locally, they brought labour from Tamil Nadu, where frequent droughts had thrown lakhs out of workers out of job. Initially, the presence of Indian labour did not cause any local resentment as the plantation economy was independent of the local village economy. It was when some form of representative government was introduced in the 20th century that the presence of Indian workers began to be seen as a threat by the locals. Politicians began to gather support on the basis of community affiliations. The British encouraged representation on communal or ethnic basis. There was separate representation for Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims in the councils they set up.
In the first part of the 20th century, communal politics was exacerbated by the Government of India’s concern for the welfare of Indians working overseas. The concern stemmed from the Indian nationalist movement, which was pressing the British to get a better deal for the Indian workers who were treated virtually as slaves. The British government in Ceylon was under pressure from three quarters: namely, the newly emerging Sinhalese political elite which wanted a reduction of the Indian element in the population, the British planters who were keen on retaining the labour, and Government of India which wanted Colombo to ensure a better deal for the Indian worker.
Sinhalese nationalist leaders were at loggerheads with Indian nationalists on the issue of Indians in Ceylon, who were in every walk of life by the 1930s. In fact, the nationalist movement in Ceylon was an anti-Indian movement rather than an anti-British movement.
Stripped of citizenship
Not surprisingly, the very first action of independent Ceylon was the passing of an Act in 1948 to deprive resident Indians of the right to citizenship. Nearly one million Indians were rendered “Stateless”. They were expected to leave the island, though a mass exodus of plantation workers would have ruined Sri Lanka, as tea and rubber were the only exportable goods those days. However, New Delhi stemmed this by entering into bilateral negotiations with Sri Lanka. After hard negotiations, India agreed to take 525,000 people, and Sri Lanka 300,000. The fate of another 150,000 was left undecided. India undertook to repatriate the numbers assigned to it. But when India dragged its feet on repatriation, Sri Lanka delayed grant of citizenship to the lot given to it. Very few plantation workers were eager to be repatriated, as in the early years of independence, economic conditions in India were worse. In fact, there was a lot of illegal Indian immigration to Sri Lanka, and the immigrants were derided and hunted down as “kalla thonis” (illegal boat people).
The leader of the plantation workers, S.Thondaman, was hurt that his people should be treated like a “sack of potatoes” and divided among two countries. Fed up with the Indian approach, he struck a deal with Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene (JR) in 1987, under which Sri Lanka would give citizenship to all except those who had opted for India. At that time, JR was keen on cultivating the Indian Tamil community, as the North Eastern “Sri Lanka Tamil” insurgency was in full swing. In 2003, through an all-party consensus, all, including those who were earmarked for repatriation to India, were given Sri Lankan citizenship.
North-East Tamil question
While the Indian Origin Tamil problem was solved without Indian intervention, the problem of the North Eastern “Sri Lankan Tamils” brought India into conflict with Sri Lanka. In 1983, the anti-Tamil riots, sparked by the Tamil demand for an independent Eelam took a violent form, sending 150,000 Sri Lankan Tamils fleeing to Tamil Nadu as refugees. This touched off an unceasing sympathetic wave across Tamil Nadu. Tamils in India suddenly rediscovered kinship with the Tamils of Sri Lanka, which had snapped long ago due to a variety of factors.
This led to India forcing President Jayewardene to sign an Accord with it in 1987, which set up Provincial Councils with some degree of autonomy, as per the new 13th Amendment of the Sri Lankan Constitution. An Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was sent to implement the Accord and disarm the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which was fixated on securing Eelam.
The Accord and the induction of the IPKF were despised by both the Sinhalese and the Tamils. The LTTE went to war against the IPKF in 1987, and President R. Premadasa ordered the withdrawal of the IPKF in 1990. In 1991, the LTTE assassinated former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi for sending the IPKF.
Following these developments, India kept aloof from Sri Lankan affairs allowing the island to stew in its own ethnic juice. But by the second half of the 1990s, India had stepped up trade links with Sri Lanka through a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The FTA boosted two way trade exponentially. But India was the larger beneficiary, to the chagrin of many Sri Lankans. Later in the 2000s, with an anti-terrorism wave sweeping the globe after 9/11, India stepped up military cooperation with Sri Lanka. When President Mahinda Rajapaksa unleashed Eelam War IV to decimate the LTTE in 2006, India helped him covertly.
However, since India felt that it can never remain aloof from the Sri Lankan Tamil question because of the pro-Sri Lankan Tamil outcry in Tamil Nadu, it extracted a promise from Rajapaksa that he will fully implement the 13th Amendment and even go beyond it. But Rajapaksa has not fulfilled his promises, to date. Over the years, powers under 13th Amendment have been whittled away causing much dismay in New Delhi. Tamil Nadu upped its ante following charges that the Sri Lankan forces had committed war crimes in the final phase of Eelam War IV in which 40,000 Tamil civilians were allegedly massacred by shelling.
New Delhi is now fully backing the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) in Sri Lanka. But the TNA is seen by Rajapaksa as a former “proxy” of the LTTE which has become an “incarnation” of the LTTE. The TNA is shunned by Rajapaksa though it is ruling the Northern Province. India has been unsuccessfully urging Rajapaksa to talk to the TNA and work out a solution which can be put to the other parties for a broader consensus.
Resenting India’s meddlesome behaviour, Sri Lanka has refused to sign a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with it, which India is very keen on.
Enter China
As a further bulwark against India, Rajapaksa is building very strong ties with China. He has given China more than a foothold in the Sri Lankan economy. Heavy concessions have been given to Chinese state enterprises which have often come up with unsolicited projects in the infrastructure sector. Chinese loans have been taken at high interest without a thought about how they can be repaid by a country which is already neck deep in debt. India fears that debt may turn Sri Lanka into a client state of China, which could use its presence in Sri Lanka to threaten India, if relations with India sour.
Fishing in troubled waters
Poaching by Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry fishermen in North Sri Lanka is another issue which has recently cropped up to bedevil bilateral relations. Tamil Nadu fishermen do not recognise the sea boundary agreement signed in the mid- 1970s and claim a “traditional right” to fish in Palk Bay and Palk Strait. The agreement was signed without consulting them. An annoyed Sri Lanka has been detaining intruders and their boats, causing distress on the Indian side. Sri Lanka also wants the Indians to eschew “bottom trawling” but the latter say this cannot be done overnight.
At their meeting in New York on 28 September, in the sidelines of the UN General Assembly address by Prime Minister Modi, President Rajapaksa once again brought up the “bottom trawling” practice allowed only to the Indian fishermen and banned for the Sri Lankan fishermen. It is clear that this is one of the contentious, unresolved issues between the two countries right now, with New Delhi under severe pressure from Tamil Nadu too. The President also reportedly assured that his government was assisting the Northern Province, particularly with financial resources in the amount of Rs. 1.5 billion that has been made available in this year’s budget. This is significant in the light of the support India has given to the TNA.
Be that as it may, it is clear that between Tamil Nadu and Colombo, New Delhi has its hands full. India under Modi will have to address the contentious issues soon. It should not become a case of Delhi running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. There will hopefully be some light soon at the end of this tunnel.
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P.K.Balachandran
The writer is presently Correspondent of The New Indian Express in Sri Lanka. Previously, he has worked for The Hindustan Times at Colombo and Chennai, The Indian Express and Newstime in Chennai, The Herald Review in Bangalore and Press Trust of India in New Delhi. He has also served as Reuters correspondent in Chennai and as a contributor to The Economist from Colombo.[/column]